In this article, we study logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics. We compare the relative expressivity of the two logics. It turns out that they are incomparable over various classes of neighborhood models, and the combination of the two logics are equally expressive as standard modal logic over any class of neighborhood models. We propose morphisms for each logic, which can help us explore the frame definability problem, show a general soundness and completeness result, and generalize some results in the literature. We axiomatize the two logics over various classes of neighborhood frames. Last but not least, we extend the results to the case of public announcements, which has good applications to Moore sentences and some others.
Introduction
This paper studies logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics. Intuitively, if p is true but you do not know that p, then you have an unknown truth that p; if p is false but you believe that p, then you have a false belief that p, or you are wrong about p.
The notion of unknown truths is important in philosophy and formal epistemology. For instance, it is related to Verificationism, or 'verification thesis' [31] . Verificationism says that all truths can be known. However, from the thesis, the unknown truth of p, formalized p ∧ ¬Kp, gives us a consequence that all truths are actually known. In other words, the notion gives rise to a well-known counterexample to Verificationism. This is the so-called Fitch's 'paradox of knowability' [13] . 1 To take another example: it gives rise to an important type of Moore sentences, which is essential to Moore's paradox, which says that one cannot claim the paradoxical sentence "p but I do not know it" [23, 18] . It is known that such a Moore sentence is unsuccessful and self-refuting (see, e.g. [19, 32, 33] ). 2 In addition to the axiomatization for the logic of unknown truths on topological semantics [28] , there has been various work on the metaphysical counterpart of unknown truths -accidental truths, or simply, 'accident'. The notion of accidental truths traces back at least to Leibniz, in the name of 'vérités de fait' (factual truths), see e.g. [1, 17] . This notion is related to problem of future contingents, which is formalized by a negative form of accident [2] . Moreover, it is applied to reconstruct Gödel's ontological argument (e.g. [26] ), and also to provide an additional partial verification of the Boxdot Conjecture raised in [14] (also see [30] ).
The logical investigation on the notion of accidental truths is initiated by Marcos, who axiomatizes a minimal logic of accident under relational semantics in [21] , to differentiate 'accident' from 'contingency'. 3 The axiomatization is then simplified and its various extensions are presented in [27] . Symmetric accident 1 For an excellent survey on Fitch's paradox of knowability, we refer to [4] . 2 To say a formula ϕ is successful, if it still holds after being announced, in symbol [ϕ]ϕ. Otherwise, we say this formula is unsuccessful. Moreover, to say ϕ is self-refuting, if its negation always holds after being announced, in symbol [ϕ]¬ϕ. 3 As for a recent survey on (non)contingency logic, we refer to [11] .
logic is axiomatized in [6] , and Euclidean accident logic is explored in [3] . 4 Some quite general soundness and completeness results can be found in [16] . Some relative expressivity results are obtained in [21, 6] . In comparison, the notion of false beliefs is popular in the area of cognitive science, see e.g. [24, 34] . For technical reasons, [29] proposes a logic that has the operator W as a sole modality. There, W ϕ is read "the agent is wrong about ϕ", and being wrong about ϕ means believing ϕ though ϕ is false. Complete axiomatizations of the minimal logic of false belief and its various extensions are given, and some results of frame definability are presented.
However, all this work are based on relational semantics. As the logics of unknown truths and false beliefs are non-normal (due to the non-normality of their modalities), it is then natural and interesting to investigate them from the perspective of neighborhood semantics.
Neighborhood semantics is independently proposed by Scott and Montague in 1970 [25, 22] . Since it is introduced, neighborhood semantics has become a standard semantics for investigating non-normal modal logics [5] . Partly inspired by [12] , the authors of [15] proposes neighborhood semantics for logics of unknown truths and false beliefs. According to the semantics, "it is an unknown truth that ϕ" is interpreted as "ϕ is true and the proposition expressed by ϕ is not a neighborhood of the evaluated state", and "it is a false belief that ϕ" as "ϕ is false and the proposition expressed by ϕ is a neighborhood of the evaluated state". Beyond some invariance and negative results, a minimal logic of unknown truths under relational semantics, denoted B K there, is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the class of filters, and a minimal logic of false beliefs under relational semantics, denoted A K therein, is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames that are closed under binary intersections and are negatively supplemented.
In this paper, in addition to explore the relative expressivity of logics of unknown truths and false beliefs over various classes of neighborhood models, we also axiomatize logics of unknown truths and false beliefs over various neighborhood frames. By defining notions of •-morphisms and W -morphisms, we obtain good applications to, e.g. frame (un)definability, a general soundness and completeness result, and some results that generalize those in [15] in a relative easy way. Moreover, we extend the results to the case of public announcements: by adopting the intersection semantics in the literature (which is a kind of neighborhood semantics for public announcements), we find suitable reduction axioms and thus complete proof systems, which, again, gives us good applications to some interesting questions. For instance, are Moore sentences self-refuting? How about the negation of Moore sentences? Are false beliefs of a fact successful formulas? Other natural questions also result, for instance, are all unknown truths themselves unknown truths? Are all false beliefs themselves are false beliefs?
As we will show in a proof-theoretical way, interestingly, under fairly weak assumption (namely, monotonicity), one's false belief of a fact cannot be removed even after being told: if you have a false belief, then after someone tells you this, you still have the false belief. In other words, false beliefs of facts are all successful formulas. Different from the case in relational semantics, under neighborhood semantics, Moore sentences are not self-refuting in general. But the negation of Moore sentences are successful in the presence of monotonicity. Also, all unknown truths themselves unknown truths, but not all false beliefs themselves are false beliefs, indeed, none of false beliefs themselves are false beliefs.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. After reviewing the languages and their neighborhood semantics and some common neighborhood properties (Sec. 2), we compare the relative expressivity of the languages in Sec. 3. Sec. 4 proposes notions of •-morphisms and W -morphisms and exploit their applications. Sec. 5 axiomatizes the logics over various classes of neighborhood frames, which include a general soundness and completeness result shown via the notion of W -morphisms. Sec. 6 extends the previous results to the case of public announcements, where by using intersection semantics for public announcements, we find suitable reduction axioms and complete axiomatizations, which gives us good applications to Moore sentences and some others. We conclude with some future work in Sec. 7.
Syntax and Semantics
Throughout this paper, we fix a nonempty set of propositional variables P and p ∈ P. Definition 2.1. The languages involved in the current paper include the following.
is the language of the logic of unknown truths, L(W ) is the language of the logic of false beliefs, L(•, W ) is the language of the logic of unknown truths and false beliefs, and L( ) is the language of epistemic/doxastic logic.
Intuitively, •ϕ is read "it is an unknown truth that ϕ", that is, "ϕ is true but unknown", W ϕ is read "the agent is wrong about ϕ", or "it is a false belief that ϕ", that is, "ϕ is false but believed", and ϕ is read "it is known/believed that ϕ". Other connectives are defined as usual; in particular, •ϕ is abbreviated as ¬ • ϕ, read "it is known that ϕ once it is the case that ϕ". In a philosophical context, •ϕ, •ϕ, and ϕ are read "it is accident (or accidentally true) that ϕ", "it is essential that ϕ", and "it is necessary that ϕ", respectively.
All the above-mentioned languages are interpreted over neighborhood models.
S is a nonempty set of states (or called 'possible worlds'), N is a neighborhood function from S to P(P(S)), and V is a valuation function. Intuitively, X ∈ N (s) means that X is a neighborhood of s. For any neighborhood model M and state s in M, (M, s) is called a pointed (neighborhood) model. Without considering the valuation function, we obtain a (neighborhood) frame. Given a neighborhood model M = S, N, V and a state s ∈ S, the semantics of the aforementioned languages is defined inductively as follows.
Thus one may easily verify that
, which conform to the previous readings of •ϕ, W ϕ, •ϕ, respectively. This indicates that the modalities •, W , • are all definable in the standard modal logic L( ), and therefore L( ) is at least as expressive as L(•) and also L(W ) over any class of neighborhood models.
The neighborhood properties which we mainly focus on in this paper include the following. It is known that every augmented model is a filter, but not vice versa (see e.g. [5] ).
Expressivity
This part compares the relative expressivity of L(•) and L(W ). To begin with, we give the definition of expressivity.
Definition 3.1 (Expressivity). Let L 1 and L 2 be two logical languages that are interpreted in the same class M of models,
• L 2 is at least as expressive as L 1 , notation: L 1 L 2 , if for each formula ϕ in L 1 , there exists a formula ψ in L 2 such that for each model M in M, for each state s in M, we have that M, s ϕ iff M, s ψ.
• L 1 is less expressive than L 2 , notation:
• L 1 and L 2 are equally expressive, if L 1 L 2 and L 2 L 1 .
• L 1 and L 2 are incomparable (in expressivity), if L 1 L 2 and L 2 L 1 .
The following two propositions state that the languages L(•) and L(W ) are incomparable over any model classes with the above neighborhood properties. Proof. Consider the following models, where the only difference is N ′ (s) = N (s) ∪ {{t}}, and an arrow from a state x to a set X means that X is a neighborhood of x: However, these two pointed models cannot be distinguished by any L(•)-formulas. For this, we show a stronger result that for all ϕ ∈ L(•), for all x ∈ S, M, x ϕ iff M ′ , x ϕ, that is, ϕ M = ϕ M ′ . As the two models differs only in the neighborhood of s, it suffices to show that M, s ϕ iff M ′ , s ϕ, that is,
The proof goes with induction on ϕ, where the only case to treat is •ϕ.
To begin with, suppose that M, s 
As the two models differs only in the neighborhood of s, it is sufficient to demonstrate that M, s ϕ iff M ′ , s ϕ. The proof continues with induction on ϕ, in which the only case to fix is W ϕ.
First The result below states that L(•, W ) is equally expressive as L( ) over any class of neighborhood models. This extends the result in [9] , where it is shown that the two logics are equally expressive over any class of relational models. 
Moreover, we demonstrate that ϕ ↔ W ϕ ∨ (•ϕ ∧ ϕ), as follows. Given any neighborhood model M = S, N, V and s ∈ S, we have the following equivalences:
This implies that L( ) L(•, W ), and therefore L(•, W ) is equally expressive as L( ) on any class of neighborhood models.
We
The following result indicates that the formulas of L(•) are invariant under •-morphisms.
The notion of •-morphisms can be applied to the following result in a relative easy way. Note that M t + and M t − defined on [15, p. 254 ] are, respectively, the special cases of M t + and M t − defined below when Γ w = S w . Thus our result below is an extension of [15, Thm. 1.10].
The condition (Var) is clear. For (Mor), we need to show that
and
.
The "⇐=" of (1) and "=⇒" of (2) follows directly from the fact that
Moreover, given w ∈ X, according to the definition of S w , we have X / ∈ S w , thus X / ∈ Γ w . This follows that "=⇒" of (1) and "⇐=" of (2).
Note that in the above proposition, as Γ w is defined in terms of w, thus given any two points x, y ∈ S, Γ x may be different from Γ y . This point will be used frequently in the proofs below. Now coming back to Prop. 3.2, instead of directly proving that L(•)-formulas cannot distinguish between (M, s) and (M ′ , s), we can resort to Prop. 4.3, by just noticing that M ′ = M t + where Γ s = {{t}} and Γ t = ∅. 5 With Prop. 4.3, we immediately have the following corollary, which extends the result in [15, Coro. 1.11] .
It turns out that this corollary is quite useful in exploring the problem of frame (un)definability of L(•). A frame property P is said to be definable in a language L, if there exists a set Θ of formulas in L such that F Θ iff F has P . When Θ = {ϕ}, we write simply ϕ rather than {ϕ}.
To demonstrate the undefinability of a frame property P in a language L, we (only) need to construct two frames such that one of them has P but the other fails, and any L-formula is valid on one frame if and only if it is also valid on the other. The argument is as follows: were P defined by a set of L-formulas Θ, we would derive that F Θ iff F has P . As any L-formula is valid on one frame if and only if it is also valid on the other, this also applies to the set Θ. This implies that one frame has P iff the other also has, which is a contradiction. Proof. Consider the following frames: Proof. Consider the following frames: Proof. We show that (n) is defined by •⊤. Let F = S, N .
Suppose that F has (n), to show that F •⊤. For this, for any model M based on F and s ∈ S, we need to show that M, s •⊤, which amounts to showing that S ∈ N (s) (because M, s ⊤ and ⊤ M = S). And S ∈ N (s) is immediate by supposition.
Conversely, assume that F does not have (n), then there exists s ∈ S such that S / ∈ N (s), that is,
Then by (W -Mor) again, we get ϕ M ∈ N (s) and s / ∈ ϕ M , and therefore M, s W ϕ.
The models M u + and M u − defined in [15, p. 262 ] are, respectively, the special cases of those defined in the following proposition, when Σ w = U w . Therefore, the following proposition extends the result in [15, Thm. 2.8] . 
Proof. By Prop. 4.9, it suffices to show that f : S → S such that f (x) = x is a W -morphism from M to M u + , and also a W -morphism from M to M u − . The condition (Var) is clear. For (W -Mor), we only need to show that
The "=⇒" of (1) and "⇐=" of (2) are straightforward since
Moreover, if w / ∈ X, then X / ∈ U w , thus X / ∈ Σ w . This gives us "⇐=" of (1) and "=⇒" of (2).
Similar to the case in Prop. 4.3, here Σ w is defined in terms of w, thus given any two points x, y ∈ S, Σ x may be different from Then for all ϕ ∈ L(•), we have
Similar to Coro. 4.4, Coro. 4.11 can also be applied to proving the results of frame (un)definability in L(W ). Proof. Consider the following frames:
Then by Coro. 4.11, we conclude that for all ϕ ∈ L(W ), F ϕ ⇐⇒ F ′ ϕ. Proof. Consider the following frames: We conclude this part with another application of the notion of W -morphisms. For this, we define the notion of transitive closure of a neighborhood frame, which comes from [15, Def. 2.12] .
Definition 4.14. Given a neighborhood frame F = S, N , we define its transitive closure F tc = S, N tc inductively as i∈N The following proposition is shown in [15, Thm. 2.14] , but without use of a morphism argument. Here we give a much easier proof via the notion of W -morphisms. Proof. We show a stronger result: f : S → S such that f (x) = x is a W -morphism from M to M tc . which implies the statement due to Prop. 4.9. The condition (Var) is straightforward.
For (W -Mor), we need to show that
The '=⇒' follows immediately since N (x) ⊆ N tc (x). For the other direction, if X ∈ N tc (x) and x / ∈ X, by Fact 4.15, we obtain that X ∈ N (x), as desired.
Axiomatizations
We now axiomatize L(•) and L(W ) over various neighborhood frames.
Axiomatizations for L(•)
The following lists the axioms and inference rules that are needed in this part.
Axioms
Rules PL
All instances of propositional tautologies
All axioms and inference rules arise in the literature, with distinct names, except for •M, which is derivable from axiom (K1.2) in [21] , that is,
, has usually been used to replace axiom •M (see e.g. [27, 16, 15] ).
But we prefer axioms to rules of inference. As we will see below, given RE• (and propositional calculus), the rule RM• is also derivable from •M.
Proof. We have the following proof sequences in PL + MP + •M + RE•:
If we consider all axioms and rules above, we obtain a logic called B K in [27, 16, 15] . 7 B K is the minimal logic for L(•) over relational semantics, that is, it is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all relational frames [27] . As each Kripke model is pointwise equivalent to some augmented model, B K is also (sound and) strongly complete with respect to the class of augmented frames [15] . Moreover, since every augmented model is a filter, thus B K also characterizes the class of filters. From now on, for the sake of consistency on notation, we denote the logic by K • here. As neighborhood semantics can handle logics weaker than the minimal relational logic, it is then natural to ask what logics weaker than K • look like. Here is a table that summarizes K • and its weaker logics and the corresponding classes of frames which determine them. 8 
Proof systems
Frame classes
A natural question is: are all unknown truths themselves unknown truths? Interestingly, in monotone logics, the answer is positive. We now give a proof-theoretical perspective.
Proof. Notice that we have the following proof sequences in M • .
We now focus on the completeness of the proof systems in the above table. The completeness proof is based on the construction of the canonical model. From now on, we define the proof set of ϕ in a system Λ, denoted |ϕ| Λ , as the set of maximal consistent sets of Λ that contains ϕ; in symbol, |ϕ| Λ = {s ∈ S c | ϕ ∈ s}. We skip the subscript and simply write |ϕ| whenever the system Λ is clear. If a set of states Γ is not a proof set in Λ for any formula, then we say it is a non-proof set relative to Λ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The nontrivial case is •ϕ, that is, we only need to show that M c , s •ϕ iff •ϕ ∈ s.
First, suppose that •ϕ ∈ s, to prove that M c , s •ϕ, which by induction hypothesis is equivalent to showing that ϕ ∈ s and |ϕ| / ∈ N c (s). By supposition and axiom •E, we infer that ϕ ∈ s. As •ϕ ∈ s, we have •ϕ ∧ ϕ / ∈ s, and then |ϕ| / ∈ N c (s) according to the definition of N c . Conversely, suppose that •ϕ / ∈ s, to show that M c , s •ϕ. Assume that M c , s ϕ, viz., s ∈ ϕ M c , then by induction hypothesis, s ∈ |ϕ|, namely, ϕ ∈ s. By supposition, we infer that •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s. Then from the definition of N c , it follows that |ϕ| ∈ N c (s). Now by induction hypothesis again, we conclude that ϕ M c ∈ N c (s). Therefore, M c , s •ϕ.
We also need to show that N c is well-defined. Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ N c (s) and |ϕ| = |ψ|, to show that •ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s. By supposition, we obtain •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s and ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ. By RE•, it follows that ⊢ •ϕ ↔ •ψ. Therefore, •ψ ∧ ψ ∈ s. Now it is a routine work to show the following.
Theorem 5.6. E • is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all neighborhood frames. The following is a consequence of Thm. 5.7 and Thm. 5.8.
Corollary 5.9. ECN • is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (cn)-frames. Now we deal with the completeness of M • . As in the case of monotone modal logic, the canonical neighborhood function N c is not necessarily supplemented due to the presence of non-proof sets. To deal with this problem, we use the strategy of supplementation. Proof. Suppose that M has (c). Let s ∈ S and X, N (s) . Therefore, X ∩ X ′ ∈ N + (s). This means that M + has also (c).
Assume that M has (n). Then S ∈ N (s) for all s ∈ S. Since N (s) ⊆ N + (s), thus S ∈ N + (s) for all s ∈ S. This entails that M + has also (n). "⇐=" follows directly from the fact that N c (s) ⊆ (N c ) + (s). For "=⇒", suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (N c ) + (s), then X ⊆ |ϕ| for some X ∈ N c (s). Since X ∈ N c (s), there must be a χ such that |χ| = X ∈ N c (s), and then •χ ∧ χ ∈ s. We have also |χ| ⊆ |ϕ|, then ⊢ χ → ϕ. Note that the rule RM• is derivable in M • (Prop. 5.1), thus we have ⊢ •χ ∧ χ → •ϕ ∧ ϕ, thus •ϕ ∧ ϕ ∈ s, as desired. 
Axiomatizations for L(W )
To axiomatize L(W ) over various neighborhood frames, we list the following axioms and rules of inference.
Axioms Rules PL All instances of propositional tautologies
Similar to the axiomatizations for L(•), all axioms and inference rules listed above also arise in the literature, with different names. The axiom WM is derivable from a rule ϕ → ψ (W ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) → W ψ (see [29, Thm. 3.2]), denoted RMW, which has usually been used to replace WM [29, 15] . Again, we prefer axioms to inference rules. Also, note that the rule RMW is derivable from the axiom WM in the presence of REW (and propositional calculus). Proof. We have the following proof sequences in PL + MP + WM + REW.
It is shown that the proof system consisting of all axioms and inference rules for L(W ), denoted K W here, is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all relational frames in [29] and to the class of all neighborhood frames that are closed under intersections and are negatively supplemented in [15] . 10 We will give the definition of 'negatively supplemented' later. Again, it is natural to ask what logics weaker than K W look like. Below is a table summarizing K W and its weaker logics and the corresponding frame classes that determine them.
Proof systems
Note that WE is indispensable in K W and its weaker systems in the above table. To see this, consider an auxiliary semantics which interprets all formulas of the form W ϕ as ϕ, then one may easily verify that the subsystem K W − WE is sound with respect to the auxiliary semantics, but WE is unsound, and thus WE cannot be derived from the remaining axioms and inference rules. This entails that WE is indispensable in K W , and thus WE is indispensable in the weaker systems of K W .
We can also ask the following question: are all false beliefs themselves false beliefs? Different from the notion of unknown truths, the answer to this question is negative. In fact, none of false beliefs themselves are false beliefs. We now give a proof-theoretical perspective for this.
Proof. We have the following proof sequences:
In the reminder of this section, we focus on the completeness of the four proof systems listed above, with the aid of canonical neighborhood model constructions. Unfortunately, all these systems may not be handled by a uniform canonical neighborhood function; rather, we need to distinguish systems excluding axiom WM from those including it. This is similar to the case of neighborhood contingency logics [8] . • N L (s) = {|ϕ| | W ϕ ∈ s},
Systems excluding WM
The neighborhood function N L is well defined.
Lemma 5.19. Let L be a system excluding WM. If |ϕ| = |ψ| and |ϕ| ∈ N L (s), then W ψ ∈ s.
Proof. Suppose that |ϕ| = |ψ| and |ϕ| ∈ N L (s), to prove that W ψ ∈ s. By supposition, ⊢ ϕ ↔ ψ and W ϕ ∈ s. By REW, we have ⊢ W ϕ ↔ W ψ, and thus W ψ ∈ s.
Lemma 5.20. Let L be a system excluding WM. For all ϕ ∈ L(W ), for all s ∈ S L , we have M L , s ϕ ⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ s, that is, ϕ M L = |ϕ|.
Proof. By induction on ϕ, where the nontrivial case is W ϕ.
Suppose that W ϕ ∈ s, to show that M L , s W ϕ. By supposition and axiom WE, we derive that ¬ϕ ∈ s, viz., ϕ / ∈ s, then by IH, we obtain M L , s ϕ. It suffices to show that ϕ M L ∈ N L (s), which is equivalent to showing that |ϕ| ∈ N L (s) by IH. This follows directly from the fact that W ϕ ∈ s.
Conversely, suppose that M L , s W ϕ, to prove that W ϕ ∈ s. By supposition and IH, |ϕ| ∈ N L (s) and ϕ / ∈ s. This immediately gives us W ϕ ∈ s.
Now it is a standard work to show the following.
Theorem 5.21. E W is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all neighborhood frames. 
. For the completeness, by Thm. 5.21, it is sufficient to prove that N L has the property (c). Suppose that X ∈ N L (s) and Y ∈ N L (s), then there are ϕ, ψ such that X = |ϕ| and Y = |ψ|. From |ϕ| ∈ N L (s) and |ψ| ∈ N L (s), it follows that W ϕ ∈ s and W ψ ∈ s. By axiom WC, we obtain W (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ s, thus |ϕ ∧ ψ| ∈ N L (s), namely X ∩ Y ∈ N L (s).
Systems including WM
To deal with the completeness of the systems including WM, we need to redefine the canonical neighborhood function. The reason is as follows. If we continue using the canonical neighborhood function in Def. 5.18 and the strategy of supplementation (like the case in monotone modal logics), then we also need a rule ϕ → ψ W ϕ → W ψ in the systems. However, this rule is not sound, as one may easily check.
The following canonical neighborhood function is found to satisfy the requirement.
The reader may ask why we do not use this definition for systems excluding WM. This is because it does not work for system EC W (Thm. 5.22), as one may check.
Note that Def. 5.23 does not specify the function N L completely; in addition to the proof sets that satisfy this definition, N L may also contain non-proof sets relative to L. Therefore, each of such logics has many canonical neighborhood models.
We need also show that N L is well defined. Conversely, suppose that M L , s W ϕ, to prove that W ϕ ∈ s. By supposition and IH, |ϕ| ∈ N L (s) and ϕ / ∈ s, which implies that W ϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s. Therefore, W ϕ ∈ s.
Given any system L extending M W , the minimal canonical neighborhood model for L, denoted
Similar to the cases in monotone modal logic and M • , due to the existence of non-proof sets, the canonical neighborhood function N L min is not necessarily supplemented. So again, we use the strategy of supplementation. The notion of supplementation can be found in Def. 5.10. The proof is as follows. '⇐=': This follows immediately from the fact that N L min (s) ⊆ (N L min ) + (s). '=⇒': Suppose that |ϕ| ∈ (N L min ) + (s), then there exists X ∈ N L min (s) such that X ⊆ |ϕ|. Since X ∈ N L min (s), there must be a χ such that X = |χ|. By |χ| ∈ N L min (s), we have W χ ∨ χ ∈ s. From |χ| ⊆ |ϕ| it follows that ⊢ χ → ϕ. Note that the rule RMW is derivable in M W (Prop. 5.16). Thus an application of RMW gives us ⊢ W χ ∧ ¬ϕ → W ϕ, that is, ⊢ W χ → W ϕ ∨ ϕ. From ⊢ χ → ϕ it also follows that ⊢ χ → W ϕ ∨ ϕ, and then ⊢ W χ ∨ χ → W ϕ ∨ ϕ, and therefore W ϕ ∨ ϕ ∈ s, as required.
It is shown in [15, Thm. 2.2, Coro. 2.7] that K W (denoted A K there) is sound and complete with respect to the class of all neighborhood frames that are closed under binary intersections and are negatively supplemented, where a neighborhood frame F = S, N is said to be negatively supplemented if for all s ∈ S and X, Y ⊆ S, if X ∈ N (s), X ⊆ Y and s / ∈ Y , then Y ∈ N (s). Notice that the notion of negative supplementation is weaker than that of supplementation. 11 We have seen that M W characterizes the class of neighborhood frames that are supplemented. Thus it is quite natural to ask which logic characterizes the class of neighborhood frames that are negative supplemented. As we will see, M W does this job as well.
Corollary 5.27. M W is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames that are negatively supplemented.
Proof. The proof of the soundness is the same as in Thm. 5.26, by replacing (m) with the property of 'negative supplementation'.
The completeness also follows from Thm. 5.26, since negative supplementation is weaker than supplementation.
We have the following conjecture. Note that the soundness is straightforward. In the current stage we do not know how to prove the completeness, because if we define (M L min ) + w.r.t. K W as in Thm. 5.26, by Thm. 5.26, it suffices to prove that (N L min ) + has (c), which follows directly by Fact 5.11 if N L min possesses (c). But to show N L min possesses (c), we again encounter the problem which is remarked immediately behind Def. 5.23. 12
Conjecture 5.28. K W is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of filters, and also to the class of (mc)-frames.
We close this section with a general soundness and completeness result. For those systems L including WM, as ⊤ ∈ s, thus W ⊤ ∨ ⊤ ∈ s, and hence S L = |⊤| ∈ N L min (s), then by Fact 5.11, we obtain that S L ∈ (N L min ) + (s), which means that (M L min ) + possesses (n). However, for those systems L excluding WM, as W ⊤ / ∈ s (by axiom W1), by Def. 5.18, we infer that S L = |⊤| / ∈ N L (s). Thus the canonical model M L for such systems L does not have (n). We can handle this problem with Prop. 4.10. The following general completeness result is a corollary of Prop. 4.10. Note that the following result also holds for systems including WM.
Theorem 5.29. Let L be a system of L(W ). If L is determined by a certain class of neighborhood frames, then it is also determined by the class of neighborhood frames satisfying (n).
Proof. Suppose that L is determined by a certain class C of neighborhood frames, to show that L is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of neighborhood frames satisfying (n). The soundness is clear, since the class of neighborhood frames satisfying (n) is contained in C. . Also, (n) does not broken the previous properties. Therefore, Γ is also satisfiable in a neighborhood model satisfying (n).
Corollary 5.30. The following soundness and completeness results hold:
1. E W is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (n)-frames;
2. M W is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (mn)-frames;
3. EC W is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of (cn)-frames.
Adding public announcements
Now we extend the previous results to the dynamic case: public announcements. Syntactically, we add the construct [ϕ]ϕ into the previous languages, where the formula [ψ]ϕ is read "ϕ is the case after each truthfully public announcement of ψ". Semantically, we adopt the intersection semantics proposed in [20] . That is, if M is a monotone neighborhood model with the domain S, then for any X ⊆ S, the intersection submodel M ∩X is also monotone.
We obtain the following reduction axioms for L(•, W ) and its sublanguages L(•), L(W ).
From the reduction axioms, we can see that, every formula of L(•, W ) (and thus its sublanguages) with public announcement operators can be rewritten as a formula without public announcements via finite many of steps. Thus the addition of public announcements does not increase the expressivity of the languages in question. Moreover, Theorem 6.3. Let Λ be a system of L(•) (resp. L(W ), L(•, W )). If Λ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of monotone neighborhood frames, then so is Λ plus AP, AN, AC, AA and A• (resp. plus AP, AN, AC, AA and AW, plus AP, AN, AC, AA, A• and AW) under intersection semantics.
Proof. We only need to show the validity of A• and AW. The proof for the validity of other reduction axioms can be found in [20, Thm. 1] . This then will give us the soundness. Moreover, the completeness can be shown via a standard reduction method, see [33] . Let M = S, N, V be any monotone neighborhood model and s ∈ S. For the sake of simplicity, we use M •[·] for the system that consists of M • plus the above reduction axioms involving •, and M W[·] for the system that consists of M W plus the above reduction axioms involving W .
Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we investigated logics of unknown truths and false beliefs under neighborhood semantics. More precisely, we compared the relative expressivity of the two logics, proposed notions of •-morphisms and W -morphisms with applications to frame definability, a general soundness and completeness result and some related results in the literature in a relative easy way, and axiomatized the two logics over various neighborhood frames, and finally, we extended the results to the case of public announcements, where by adopting the intersection semantics we found suitable reduction axioms and thus complete proof systems, which again has good applications to Moore sentence and some others.
An interesting question is to explore the notions of bisimulations for logics of unknown truths and false beliefs, for which notions of •-morphisms and W -morphisms might give us some inspirations. Moreover, a related research direction would be neighborhood bimodal logics with contingency and accident.
